URBACT I, as a Community Initiative Programme, was approved by the Commission on 22 December 2002 to organise exchanges among cities receiving assistance under the URBAN Programme, to draw lessons from implemented projects, and to disseminate such knowledge and know-how as widely as possible.
Urbact I created 20 thematic networks, 8 working groups, 3 studies,4 training programmes in new EU Member States, 2 Pilot Fast Track Networks and a " Support for cities " initiative.
You can find out more about the three URBACT Thematic Poles and their projects on the URBACT website: http://urbact.eu/thematic-poles.html
Total programme budget was € 28,42 million (€ 18.03 million in community contributions,€ 10,39 million in national cofinancing).
There were a number of points that emerged from Urbact I that are important to take forward in respect of the URBACT II programme:
The evaluation of the Urbact programme highlighted that whilst the programme had been successful in mobilising participation in the programme, its outcomes had no impact at a local level.
Furthermore, from peer accounts it became clear that the quality of products and outcomes delivered by the 24 networks and X working group had been very mixed. A significant percentage of the products created added nothing in terms of value added to the focus of the thematic network or the working group.
The programme created “professional tourism”. There are numerous examples of transnational meetings at which the content and outcomes were questionable.Some experts undertook “whistle stop” tours of cities , which had questionable relevance in terms of the quality of products produced.
The programme operated in a “top-down” manner. The Secreatriat operated in a classic French civil service centralised and hierarchical manner. There was a lack of structured involvement by stakeholders in the review and shaping of the programme.
The role and performance of the Secretariat was also another matter that surfaced. There were a number of issues highlighted:
The Secretariat on many occasions acted in an “executive capacity”. That is say that decisions were made which were not subject to scrutiny or approval by the Urbact Monitoring Committee. The Secretariat took a centralised control function which meant that they were often directing projects. This confused their correct role of monitoring and reviewing.
The Secretariat also undertook the evaluation of proposals submitted. This procedure was contrary to good practice in that it meant that there was no independent evaluation undertaken. This also created a culture which meant that those “favoured” by the Secretariat were assured of success.
The Secretariat initiated projects, which is directly contrary to their role. Instead of using an open and transparent procedure for inviting applications, applications were “created” by the Secretariat.
The Urbact website was an ongoing disaster. Contracts with more than 5 different providers were awarded over the 4 years and each in turn created further difficulties and problems. The cost for the website has never been made clear, but it is certain that value for money was never achieved.
The Secretariat also “controlled” access to the Urbact Monitoring Committee. Lead partners were unable to get issues placed on the agenda which they felt required the MC to review decisions made. Direct action became the only possibility and this in turn led to such lead partners as being viewed negatively by the Secretariat.
The role and quality of the Secretariat experts was also an ongoing issue of concern. No one understood what their role was and what support they provided to approved projects.
The Secretariat failed to utilise the expertise of the thematic experts. Each working group and thematic network had “approved” experts, however, this resource was never effectively used in reviewing the programme.
The Secretariat also launched actions within the programme without effective consultation with stakeholders. A large amount of resources were invested in what were known as the “Cross-thematic working groups”. None of these groups functioned effectively and furthermore the products created by these groups had marginal value. Similarly a programme of support for the EU 10 was launched without any effective assessment of the needs of the new members and also the most effective way to address their needs. Instead, a programme was launched that provided cities in EU10 with a few days of “expert advice”. This was, simply cosmetic.
Urbact I created 20 thematic networks, 8 working groups, 3 studies,4 training programmes in new EU Member States, 2 Pilot Fast Track Networks and a " Support for cities " initiative.
You can find out more about the three URBACT Thematic Poles and their projects on the URBACT website: http://urbact.eu/thematic-poles.html
Total programme budget was € 28,42 million (€ 18.03 million in community contributions,€ 10,39 million in national cofinancing).
There were a number of points that emerged from Urbact I that are important to take forward in respect of the URBACT II programme:
The evaluation of the Urbact programme highlighted that whilst the programme had been successful in mobilising participation in the programme, its outcomes had no impact at a local level.
Furthermore, from peer accounts it became clear that the quality of products and outcomes delivered by the 24 networks and X working group had been very mixed. A significant percentage of the products created added nothing in terms of value added to the focus of the thematic network or the working group.
The programme created “professional tourism”. There are numerous examples of transnational meetings at which the content and outcomes were questionable.Some experts undertook “whistle stop” tours of cities , which had questionable relevance in terms of the quality of products produced.
The programme operated in a “top-down” manner. The Secreatriat operated in a classic French civil service centralised and hierarchical manner. There was a lack of structured involvement by stakeholders in the review and shaping of the programme.
The role and performance of the Secretariat was also another matter that surfaced. There were a number of issues highlighted:
The Secretariat on many occasions acted in an “executive capacity”. That is say that decisions were made which were not subject to scrutiny or approval by the Urbact Monitoring Committee. The Secretariat took a centralised control function which meant that they were often directing projects. This confused their correct role of monitoring and reviewing.
The Secretariat also undertook the evaluation of proposals submitted. This procedure was contrary to good practice in that it meant that there was no independent evaluation undertaken. This also created a culture which meant that those “favoured” by the Secretariat were assured of success.
The Secretariat initiated projects, which is directly contrary to their role. Instead of using an open and transparent procedure for inviting applications, applications were “created” by the Secretariat.
The Urbact website was an ongoing disaster. Contracts with more than 5 different providers were awarded over the 4 years and each in turn created further difficulties and problems. The cost for the website has never been made clear, but it is certain that value for money was never achieved.
The Secretariat also “controlled” access to the Urbact Monitoring Committee. Lead partners were unable to get issues placed on the agenda which they felt required the MC to review decisions made. Direct action became the only possibility and this in turn led to such lead partners as being viewed negatively by the Secretariat.
The role and quality of the Secretariat experts was also an ongoing issue of concern. No one understood what their role was and what support they provided to approved projects.
The Secretariat failed to utilise the expertise of the thematic experts. Each working group and thematic network had “approved” experts, however, this resource was never effectively used in reviewing the programme.
The Secretariat also launched actions within the programme without effective consultation with stakeholders. A large amount of resources were invested in what were known as the “Cross-thematic working groups”. None of these groups functioned effectively and furthermore the products created by these groups had marginal value. Similarly a programme of support for the EU 10 was launched without any effective assessment of the needs of the new members and also the most effective way to address their needs. Instead, a programme was launched that provided cities in EU10 with a few days of “expert advice”. This was, simply cosmetic.
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